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ARTICLE	BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	IN	JUDICIAL	ADJUDICATION:	THE	GAPS	OF	RATIONALITY	IN	THE	CONVICTION	OF	ILLEGAL	IMMIGRANTS	
Lécia	Vicente*	
ABSTRACT	
Weighing	 principles	 and	 considering	 rules	 in	 the	 context	 of	
judicial	adjudication	to	create	a	general	theory	of	State	and	Law	is	a	
challenge	 of	 hermeneutics	 that	 the	 Author	 makes.	 To	 meet	 this	
challenge	 the	Author	uses	a	decision	of	an	administrative	court	 in	
Portugal	 –	 the	 Tribunal	 Administrativo	 Central	 Norte.	 The	 fact-
pattern	of	that	decision	involved	a	foreign	citizen	living	illegally	in	
the	country.	While	illegally	residing	in	the	country,	that	citizen	was	
a	victim	of	a	crime	of	bodily	harm.	She	complained	to	the	police.	The	
police	 asked	her	 for	 her	 passport	 to	 proceed	with	 the	 claim.	They	
realized	she	was	Brazilian	and	that	she	was	residing	illegally	in	the	
country.	Consequently,	rather	than	proceeding	with	the	complaint,	
the	police	activated	 the	process	 of	 expulsion	of	 the	 foreign	 citizen	
from	the	country	for	she	was	an	illegal	resident.	A	judge	confirmed	
the	 order	 of	 expulsion.	 That	 foreign	 citizen	 filed	 an	 action	 for	 an	
injunction	to	stop	the	order	of	expulsion	from	being	enforced.	In	this	
context,	must	or	must	not	a	judge	within	the	trial	of	an	action	for	an	
injunction	confirm	the	decision	of	expulsion	of	a	foreign	citizen	who	
is	illegally	in	the	country,	but	who	was	a	victim	of	a	crime	of	bodily	
harm?	This	case	resonates	with	many	other	reported	cases	all	over	
the	 world	 involving	 illegal	 immigrants,	 their	 children,	 and	 their	
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families	 who	 face	 harsh	 judgments.	 For	 the	 judge,	 the	 challenge	
inherent	in	these	cases	is	to	balance	fundamental	rights	in	light	of	
constitutional	 principles	 to	 avoid	 disproportionate	 solutions.	
Principles	are	measured	up	and	scaled	down;	but	ultimately,	every	
citizen,	illegally	staying	in	a	country	or	not,	is	lifted	by	their	human	
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 1.	 JOHN	RAWLS,	A	THEORY	OF	JUSTICE	3-4	(1999).	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1009	
I.	INTRODUCTION:	THE	PROBLEM	A	judgment	of	an	administrative	court	in	Portugal—Tribunal	
Administrativo	 Central	 Norte 2—dismissed	 the	 appeal	 from	 the	decision	 of	 an	 Administrative	 and	 Tax	 Court—Tribunal	
Administrativo	e	Fiscal	de	Penafiel—filed	by	a	Brazilian	citizen.	The	appealed	decision	had	dismissed	the	action	for	an	injunction	filed	by	that	Brazilian	citizen.	The	action	for	an	injunction	was	meant	to	suspend	the	administrative	act	ordered	by	the	General	Director	of	the	Portuguese	Immigration	and	Border	Services,	determining	the	expulsion	of	that	Brazilian	citizen	from	Portugal.	This	citizen	was	an	 illegal	 immigrant	 in	 the	 Portuguese	 territory.	While	 she	was	illegally	staying	in	the	country,	she	was	a	victim	of	a	crime	of	bodily	harm.	Notwithstanding	the	analysis	of	the	arguments	used	by	the	court	throughout	the	judgment,3	the	central	question	of	this	Article	is	 the	 following.	 In	 the	 event	 that	 a	 foreign	 citizen	who	 illegally	resides	in	the	country	is	a	victim	of	a	crime	of	bodily	harm	and	for	that	reason	files	a	complaint	with	the	police,	should	or	should	not	a	court,	within	an	action	for	an	injunction	(and	in	an	appeal	against	the	lower	court’s	decision)	uphold	the	administrative	decision	to	expel	 that	 illegal	 immigrant	 from	 the	 country?	 This	 scenario	unfolds	a	conflict	between	the	constitutional	principle	of	equality	between	foreign	citizens	and	Portuguese	citizens	and	the	principle	of	 legality,	 inherent	 to	administrative	 law.	This	case	raises	other	fundamental	questions.	What	does	a	principle	mean?	Is	the	conflict	between	 the	principles	of	 legality	and	equality	admissible	 in	 the	realm	of	administrative	law?4	In	other	words,	does	this	case	raise	
 2.	 Opinion	of	the	Administrative	Court	Central	North	No	00490/06.8BEPNF	(2007)	(Portugal),	 IGFEJ	 (Feb.	 2,	 2019),	 available	 at	http://www.dgsi.pt/jtcn.nsf/89d1c0288c2dd49c802575c8003279c7/eb01fe0c46f395568025725a005d4381?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,00490%2F06.8BEPNF%20	[https://perma.cc/7HJP-ZYKH].	3.	 The	Author	examined	this	judgment	for	the	first	time	for	an	investigative	project	about	the	theory	of	argumentation	hosted	by	the	Research	Center	on	Law	and	Society	of	the	Faculty	of	Law	of	the	Nova	University	of	Lisbon	(“CEDIS”)	back	in	2009.	After	more	than	a	decade,	 the	problems	raised	by	the	court	decision	in	respect	to	 immigration	still	resonate.	For	a	reference	to	the	investigative	work	developed	by	CEDIS,	see	the	following	link:	https://cedis.fd.unl.pt/	[https://perma.cc/4Y3H-SXXD]	(last	visited	Mar.	14,	2020).	4.	 The	principle	of	legality	(or	the	rule	of	law)	is	a	core	principle	of	administrative	proceedings	 in	 most	 Member	 States	 of	 the	 European	 Union.	 This	 principle	 also	 is	 a	fundamental	 principle	 of	 European	 Administrative	 Law,	 which,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	reverberates	the	way	French	law	conceives	the	principle	of	legality.	For	a	definition	of	the	principle	of	legality,	see	Ján	Klucka,	The	General	Trends	of	EU	Administrative	Law,	41	INT’L	
1010	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	a	problem	of	legal	and	constitutional	interpretation,	or	is	it	just	a	matter	of	principle	in	the	sense	that	the	acceptance	of	a	common	political	morality	can	lead	us?	The	 Portuguese	 legal	 system	 allows	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	principle	of	legality	over	the	principle	of	equality	even	in	situations	when	that	prevalence	may	violate	the	individual’s	rights,	freedoms,	and	guarantees.	To	understand	if	the	prevalence	of	the	principle	of	legality	is	justified	under	the	circumstances,	the	Author	follows	in	the	 footsteps	 of	 Robert	 Alexy	 and	 starts	 from	 the	 premise	 that	principles	are	commands	of	optimization.	To	this	end,	she	lists	the	following	 ancillary	 questions	 to	 which	 she	 provides	 an	 answer	throughout	the	text:	1.	 What	are	the	interests	that	the	applicable	rules	protect?	2.	 What	 is	 the	 relationship	 that	 exists	 or	 should	 exist	between	principles	and	rules,	especially	when	administrative	authorities	 subordinate	 the	 right	 to	physical	 integrity	 to	 the	principle	of	legality,	and	that	fact,	in	and	of	itself,	advocates	an	attack	to	the	principles	of	equity	and	justice	as	the	sole	end	of	the	democratic	State	and	any	other	dimension	of	morality?	3.	 How	can	a	court	decision	on	the	merits	of	an	action	for	an	injunction	only	be	based	on	black	 letter	 law	when	there	 is	a	conflict	 between	 the	 principles	 of	 legality	 and	 equality	 that	undermines	 the	 individual’s	 fundamental	 right	 to	 physical	protection?	4.	 Is	judicial	activism	a	solution	to	the	problem?	5.	 If	 judicial	 activism	 is	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problem,	 is	 it	 a	reflection	 or	 reverberation	 of	 a	 current	 crisis	 of	 legal	positivism	and	utilitarian	perceptions	of	the	Law?5	
 L.	1047,	1048	(2007)	(saying	that	the	principle	of	legality	determines	that	administrative	authorities	act	exclusively	within	limits	set	up	by	the	law.	Furthermore,	the	Author	states	that	“The	judicially	reviewable	principles	that	limit	the	autonomy	of	the	administration	are	thus	 essential	 guarantees	 for	 the	 respect	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law”).	 The	 question	 in	 the	 text	regarding	the	apparent	opposition	between	the	principles	of	legality	and	equality	aims	at	exposing	 that	 administrative	 law	 serves	 as	 a	 playing	 field	 for	 the	 interaction	 between	
concordia	discordantium	principiae.	5.	 The	Author	could	ask	other	questions.	For	example:	what	is	the	role	of	the	civil	law	judge	 in	the	application	and	interpretation	of	 the	 law?	Does	the	civil	 law	judge	have	an	active	role	in	creating	the	law?	If	not,	should	the	civil	law	judge	claim	it?	To	what	extent	can	judges	in	the	civil	law	tradition,	by	assuming	a	dynamic	role	within	the	sources	of	law,	decide	outside	 the	parameters	of	 the	State	 law?	Do	civil	 law	 judges	act	ex	officio	 -	 and,	therefore,	are	limited	by	the	normative	production	of	the	State	-	or,	using	the	rationality	of	their	arguments,	will	civil	law	judges	have	such	legitimacy	to	construe	legal	arguments	that	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1011	The	Author	analyzes	how	the	judge’s	decision	could	have	been	different	 had	 they	 adequately	weighed	 or	 ranked	 the	 principles	and	rules	of	law	contained	in	the	legal	provisions	applicable	to	the	case.	 The	 Author	 analyzes	 this	 within	 the	 rationality	 and	 legal	argumentation	of	Robert	Alexy,	and	the	ideas	of	morality,	integrity,	and	 material	 justice	 present	 in	 Ronald	 Dworkin’s	 discourse.	Besides,	more	than	the	analysis	of	the	suitability	of	the	norms,	the	analysis	 of	 the	 facts	 should	 be	 the	 object	 of	 a	 post-positivist	hermeneutic	attitude.	There	is	an	implicit	context	here	dominated	by	xenophobic,	sexist,	moralistic	values—the	plaintiff	is	a	Brazilian	woman,	 and	 therefore,	 presumably	 a	 prostitute,	 a	 subhuman	category	that	can	be	beaten	up	and	that	the	judge	did	not	scumble	for	purposes	of	appraising	the	merit	of	the	plaintiff’s	pleadings.	
II.	PRACTICAL	ARGUMENTS	AND	LEGAL	ARGUMENTS	IN	CONTEXT	
A.	 Robert	Alexy:	from	practical	discourse	to	legal	discourse	Alexy,	unlike	authors	like	MacCormick,6	starts	from	a	theory	of	 general	 practical	 argumentation	 to	 build	 the	 structure	 of	 the	legal	 discourse	 and	 argumentation.	 Thus,	 legal	 discourse	 is	considered	by	Alexy	as	a	special	case	of	general	practical	discourse	or	 moral	 discourse. 7 	The	 classification	 of	 legal	 discourse	 as	 a	
 go	beyond	the	frontiers	of	positive	 law?	However,	 these	are	prior	theoretical	problems.	Moreover:	 considering	 the	 problem	 under	 analysis	 in	 the	 text,	 responding	 to	 these	questions	may	be	even	a	useless	endeavor.	Here,	the	judge	does	not	seem	to	be	creating	the	law.	Instead,	they	are	ranking	the	rules,	for	which	it	is	enough	to	resort	to	hermeneutics	or	constitutional	interpretative	arguments.	6 .	 The	 analysis	 of	 other	 modern	 theories	 of	 argumentation	 such	 as	 those	 of	Wittgenstein,	 Austin,	 Hare,	 Toulmin,	 Stevenson,	 or	 Baier	 is	 equally	 compelling.	 These	authors	 have	 greatly	 influenced	 Alexy’s	 scholarship.	 However,	 Alexy’s	 theory	 of	argumentation	places	him	closer	to	legal	interpretivism	alongside	authors	like	Dworkin.	
See	ROBERT	ALEXY,	A	THEORY	OF	LEGAL	ARGUMENTATION:	THE	THEORY	OF	RATIONAL	DISCOURSE	AS	 THEORY	 OF	 LEGAL	 JUSTIFICATION	 (Ruth	 Adler	 &	 Neil	 MacCormick	 trans.,	 1989)	 1978	[hereinafter	ALEXY	ARGUMENTATION].	7.	 	 See	id.	at	14-15.	Providing	that	legal	reasoning	is,		[.	 .	 .]	 a	 linguistic	 activity	 which	 occurs	 in	 many	 different	 situations	 from	courtroom	to	classroom.	This	linguistic	activity	is	concerned,	in	a	sense	yet	to	be	more	precisely	defined,	with	the	correctness	of	normative	statements.	It	will	be	expedient	 to	designate	such	activity	 ‘discourse’	and,	 further,	 since	 it	concerns	the	correctness	of	normative	statements,	as	‘practical	discourse.’	Legal	discourse	is	a	special	case	of	general	practical	discourse.	
 	
1012	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	special	case	of	general	practical	discourse	is	crucial	to	understand	that	both	types	of	discourse	are	concerned	with	the	correctness	of	normative	statements.	Legal	discourse	is	a	special	case	because	it	is	 limited	 by	 its	 own	 sources	 such	 as	 statutory	 law,	 precedents,	procedure,	and	doctrine.	A	 legal	statement	 that	 is	correct	means	that	 it	 is	 rationally	 justifiable	despite	 the	 limitations	of	 the	 legal	discourse. 8 	By	 adopting	 an	 “normative-analytical”	 approach, 9	Alexy	developed	a	theory	of	original	legal	argumentation.	Alexy’s	doctrine,	which	is	of	Kantian	origin	and	Habermasian	inspiration,10	intends	to	create	a	normative	theory	of	 legal	argumentation	that	allows	 to	 disentangle	 the	 good	 from	 the	 bad	 arguments, 11 	and	allows	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 logical	 structure	 of	 the	 arguments,	through	the	incorporation	of	empirical	elements.12	
 
But	see	 JÜRGEN	HABERMAS,	BETWEEN	FACTS	AND	NORMS:	CONTRIBUTIONS	TO	A	DISCOURSE	THEORY	OF	LAW	AND	DEMOCRACY	233	(William	Rehg	trans.,	1996)	(1992)	stating	that,		[.	.	.]	one	should	not	conceive	legal	discourse	as	a	special	case	of	moral	discourses	[.	.	.].	The	procedural	principles	tested	and	confirmed	in	practice	and	the	maxims	of	interpretation	canonized	in	textbooks	on	legal	method	will	be	satisfactorily	captured	 in	 a	 discourse	 theory	 only	 when	 the	 network	 of	 argumentation,	bargaining,	and	political	communications	in	which	the	legislative	process	occurs	has	been	more	thoroughly	analyzed	than	it	has	been	to	date.		Later	on,	Habermas	points	out	that,	“Although	the	special	case	thesis,	in	one	version	or	another,	is	plausible	from	a	heuristic	standpoint,	it	suggests	that	law	is	subordinate	to	morality.	This	subordination	is	misleading,	because	it	is	still	burdened	by	natural-law	connotations.”	8.	 ALEXY	ARGUMENTATION,	supra	note	6,	at	16.	9.	 Id.	at	16.	10.	 Id.	at	114	(maintaining	that	“[t]he	decisive	step	for	Habermas	consists	in	his	claim	that	 the	 ‘naturally	 evolved	 and	 internally	 regulated’	 language-system	 on	 which	 every	argumentation	 rests	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 must,	 in	 turn,	 itself	 be	 the	 subject	 of	argumentation”).	11.	 Id.	at	178	providing	that,		To	be	sure,	mere	reference	to	the	fact	that	normative	statements	are	amenable	to	discussion	is	as	yet	no	conclusive	reason	for	speaking	of	their	amenability	to	justification	 on	 their	 correctness.	 Such	 discussions	 might	 be	 no	 more	 than	contrivances	 for	 persuading,	 for	 exerting	 psychological	 influence.	 The	 crucial	question	is	whether	there	are	criteria	or	rules	for	distinguishing	good	from	bad	reasons,	valid	from	invalid	arguments.	12.	 Id.	at	28-29.	These	 analytical	 investigations	would	 have	 to	 be	 supplemented	 by	 empirical	studies	of	 legal	decision-making	behaviour.	It	might	be	seen	as	a	defect	 in	the	current	 work	 that	 these	 things	 are	 not	 attempted	 here.	 It	 is,	 however,	 not	possible	 for	 everything	 to	 happen	 at	 once.	 It	 would	 be	 enough	 if	 the	investigations	presented	here	could	make	a	contribution	to	the	foundation	of	a	theory	of	rational	 legal	argumentation—a	theory	which,	 it	 is	to	be	hoped,	will	one	 day	 be	 so	 firmly	 grounded	 and	 so	widely	 developed	 that	 it	will	 not	 only	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1013	For	 Alexy	 and	 Habermas,	 the	 theory	 of	 argumentation	 is	 a	theory	 of	 procedure. 13 	The	 procedure,	 that	 is,	 the	 relevant	decision-making	process,	may	or	may	not	include	the	possibility	of	modifying	the	individuals’	normative	and	factual	beliefs	as	well	as	their	interests	from	what	those	normative	and	factual	beliefs	and	interests	looked	like	at	the	beginning	of	the	procedure.	This	theory	of	 procedure	 offers	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 so-called	 “Münchhausen	Trilemma.”14	The	 procedure	 Alexy	 proposes	 consists	 of	 a	 set	 of	semantic	 and	 practical	 rules	 to	 avoid	 what	 according	 to	 Alexy	would	 be	 a	 real	 dilemma.	 Such	 a	 dilemma	 boils	 down	 to	 the	following	 fact.	 The	 continuous	 justification	 of	 normative	statements	may	either	lead	us	to	a	situation	of	infinite	regress,	or	to	 a	 rule	 that	 is	 psychologically	 and	 sociologically	 grounded	but	unamenable	 to	 argumentation. 15 	Those	 semantic	 and	 practical	rules	that	Alexy	proposes	aim	to	transform	the	practical	discourse	into	 a	 rational	 one. 16 	However,	 because	 the	 rules	 of	 practical	discourse	do	not	guarantee	a	solution	to	an	ethical-moral	dilemma	
 clarify	 the	 character	 of	 legal	 science	 as	 a	 normative	 discipline	 but	 will	 also	provide	practical	guidelines	for	the	practicing	lawyer.		Alexy	recognizes	that	“…almost	all	legal—just	as	almost	all	general	practical—argument	forms	include	empirical	elements.”	Id.	at	232.	13.	 JÜRGEN	HABERMAS	supra	note	7,	at	237	maintaining	that	“[t]he	legal	discourse	of	the	court	[.	.	.]	is	played	out	in	a	procedural-legal	vacuum,	so	that	reaching	a	judgement	is	left	up	to	the	judge’s	professional	ability:	“With	respect	to	the	effect	of	the	reception	of	the	evidence,	the	court	decides	according	to	its	free	conviction	obtained	from	the	entire	trial.”	The	aim	is	to	preserve	legal	discourse	from	external	influences	by	moving	it	outside	the	actual	procedure.”	 	On	the	other	hand,	Dworkin	rejects	the	proposition	that,	 in	order	to	demonstrate	the	rights	the	parties	are	entitled	to	under	a	hard	case,	it	is	necessary	to	resort	to	a	procedure.	The	argument	 that	 “no	proposition	can	be	 true	unless	 it	can,	at	 least	 in	principle,	be	demonstrated	to	be	true”	does	not	include,	in	particular,	the	application	of	claims	about	rights.	See	RONALD	DWORKIN,	TAKING	RIGHTS	SERIOUSLY	81	(2009).	14.	 HANS	ALBERT,	TRATADO	DA	RAZÃO	CRÍTICA	[TREATISE	OF	CRITICAL	REASONING]	26-28	(J.C.B.	Mohr	(Paul	Siebeck)	trans.,	1976)	(1968).		15.	 See	ALEXY	ARGUMENTATION,	supra	note	6,	at	179.	See	also	KARL	R.	POPPER,	THE	LOGIC	OF	SCIENTIFIC	DISCOVERY	93-94	(1968).		16.	 See	ALEXY	ARGUMENTATION,	supra	note	6,	at	179.		This	 ‘Münchhausen	 Trilemma’	 (as	H.	 Albert	 calls	 it)	 is,	 however,	 not	without	remedy.	It	can	be	avoided	by	dropping	the	demand	for	ever	further	justification	of	 every	 statement	 by	 another	 statement,	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 set	 of	 requirements	governing	the	procedure	of	justification.	These	requirements	can	be	formulated	as	rules	of	rational	discussion.	The	rules	of	rational	discussion	do	not	relate	only	to	statements	as	do	the	rules	of	logic,	but	reach	out	beyond	them	to	govern	the	conduct	 of	 the	 speaker.	 To	 this	 extent	 they	 can	 be	 called	 ‘pragmatic	 rules.’	Observance	of	these	rules	does	certainly	not	guarantee	the	conclusive	certainty	of	all	results,	but	it	does	nevertheless	mark	the	results	out	as	rational	ones.	
1014	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	legal	 procedure	 is	 a	 way	 of	 filling	 the	 rationality	 gaps	 of	 the	practical	discourse.	Considering	the	 illustration	of	the	problem	–	the	claim	of	 the	Brazilian	citizen	who	was	a	victim	of	a	crime	of	bodily	 harm	while	 illegally	 residing	 in	 Portugal	—the	 Author	 is	interested	in	the	justification	of	the	Law,	from	a	discursive	point	of	view,	based	on	its	normative	dimension.	
B.	Legal	Discourse	and	Argumentation	as	Means	of	Rationality.	The	
Creation	of	a	General	Theory	of	State	and	Law	In	the	legal	discourse,	similarly	to	the	moral	discourse,	there	is	 a	 claim	 for	 correction,	 and	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 general	 practical	discourse	 described	 above	 are	 also	 applied.	 However,	 in	 this	context,	 rather	 than	 demonstrating	 the	 level	 of	 rationality	 of	 a	premise,	 by	 using	 the	 legal	 discourse	 the	 interpreter	 seeks	 to	demonstrate	that	they	can	rationally	ground	a	proposition	within	the	framework	of	the	current	legal	order.	Consequently,	the	legal	discourse	has	its	own	rules	that	 impose	subjection	to	the	law,	to	propositions,	and	legal	dogma.17	However,	Alexy	understands	that	due	to	the	influence	of	the	frailty	 of	 the	 practical	 discourse	 in	 the	 legal	 discourse,	 the	application	of	the	legal	rules	inevitably	does	not	result	in	one	sole	correct	 solution. 18 	We	 are,	 in	 effect,	 in	 the	 dimension	 of	 the	discursively	 possible.19 	As	 in	 practical	 or	 moral	 argumentation,	also	in	legal	argumentation,	discourse	participants	can	rationally	discuss	 normative	 conceptions	 and	 implicit	 values,	 modify	 or	correct	such	conceptions	or	eliminate	the	shortcomings	evident	in	the	legal	system.	The	practical	value	of	a	theory	of	legal	argumentation	can	only	be	revealed	in	the	context	of	a	general	theory	of	State	and	Law,	that	is	capable	of	uniting	the	model	of	the	legal	system	as	a	system	of	procedures	to	the	model	of	the	legal	system	as	a	system	of	norms.	
 17.	 On	the	justification	of	a	normative	premise	or	legal	decision	through	internal	and	external	justification,	see	id.	at	221-95.	18.	 Dworkin	goes	in	the	opposite	direction,	calling	those	who	consider	that	there	are	no	 correct	 answers	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 morality	 or	 interpretation	 skeptics.	 See	 RONALD	DWORKIN,	LAW’S	EMPIRE	76-86	(1998);	DWORKIN,	supra	note	13,	at	82	(saying	“[s]o	there	is	no	important	difference	in	philosophical	category	or	standing	between	the	statement	that	slavery	is	wrong	and	the	statement	that	there	is	a	right	answer	to	the	question	of	slavery,	namely	that	it	is	wrong”).	19.	 ALEXY	ARGUMENTATION,	supra	note	6,	at	135-36.	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1015	The	 judge	 that	 decided	 the	 case	 of	 the	Brazilian	 citizen	was	not	democratically	 elected.	 The	 case	 challenges	 the	 constitutional	principle	of	equality.	The	judgment	of	the	court	needs	justification.	Democracies	are	subject	to	the	rule	of	majority.	However,	courts	lack	 that	 democratic	 legitimacy.	 So	 why	 should	 court	 decisions	take	precedence	over	constitutional	principles	that	are	reflection	of	 human	 rights	 and	 have	 been	 accepted	 by	 the	 People	 of	 that	state?	The	 lack	of	democratic	 legitimacy	of	 the	 courts	 raises	 the	issue	 of	 institutional	 control	 of	 the	 controlling	 institution—the	court.	Alexy	created	a	system	that	allows	the	interpreter	to	weigh	constitutional	principles.	The	interpreter’s	activity	is	constrained	by	rules	of	procedure,	which	means	that	interpretation	also	is	an	exercise	of	state	authority.	Again,	all	state	authority	stems	from	the	will	of	the	People.	However,	one	must	resist	to	only	attributing	a	decisionistic	effect	to	democracy	for	it	follows	the	rule	of	majority.	Argumentation	complements	the	rules	of	procedure	which	courts	abide	 by.	 Thus,	 the	 courts’	 agency	 is	 decisionistic	 and	argumentative	at	the	same	time.	Besides	the	procedural	rules,	their	decisions	 must	 be	 grounded	 in	 good	 arguments	 that	 are	 just,	normatively	ideal,	correct	or	rationally	justifiable.	A	general	theory	of	State	and	Law	 intends	 to	 show	 that	 the	practice	of	 law	 is	not	foreign	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 normative	 system	 also	 contains	fundamental	rights	or	principles.20	
III.	BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	AND	THE	RULES	OF	JUDICIAL	
ADJUDICATION	
A.	The	“Weight	Formula”	and	the	prevailing	principle	There	are	several	criteria	set	forth	to	distinguish	rules	from	principles. 21 	Alexy	 defines	 principles	 as	 “optimization	requirements,”	because	“they	can	be	satisfied	to	varying	degrees,	and	[…]	the	appropriate	degree	of	satisfaction	depends	not	only	on	what	is	factually	possible	but	also	on	what	is	legally	possible.”22	In	turn,	he	defines	rules	as	“norms	which	are	always	either	fulfilled	or	
 20.	 See	Robert	Alexy,	Balancing,	Constitutional	Review,	and	Representation,	3	INT'L	J.	CONST.	L.	572	(2005);	Robert	Alexy,	Constitutional	Rights,	Democracy,	and	Representation,	3	RICHERCHE	GIURIDICHE	[LEGAL	RESEARCH]	197	(2014).	21.	 See	ROBERT	ALEXY,	A	THEORY	OF	CONSTITUTIONAL	RIGHTS	44-47	(Julian	Rivers	trans.,	2002)	(1986).		22.	 Id.	at	47-48.	
1016	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	not.” 23 	For	 Alexy,	 rules	 have	 a	 “definitive	 character.” 24 	Alexy	equates	 principles	 with	 standards	 that	 are	 part	 of	 an	 ideal	normative	 dimension,	 placing	 the	 reader	 on	 a	 deontological	sphere.	 From	 now	 on,	 the	 Author	 focuses	 on	 the	 collision	 of	principles.	The	set	of	principles,	rules	(and	also	political	guidelines)	that	ground	the	Constitution	do	not	always	converge.	Hence,	the	best	way	to	resolve	a	situation	of	conflict	of	interests,	that	is,	when	the	application	of	both	principles	seems	 to	be	adequate	 to	solve	 the	problem,	is	to	weigh	those	conflicting	principles.	By	following	this	path,	the	judge	will	try	not	to	upset,	or	to	upset	as	little	as	possible,	the	 interests	 protected	 by	 the	 colliding	 principles.25	The	 Author	focuses	 on	 the	 collision	 between	 the	 constitutional	 principles	 of	equality26	and	legality.27	
 23.	 Id.	at	48.	24.	 Id.	at	57.	25.	 See,	 e.g.,	 the	 case	 repeatedly	 cited	 by	 Alexy	 where	 the	 Federal	 Constitutional	Court	of	Germany	had	to	decide	if	the	satirical	magazine	“Titanic”	should	be	ordered	to	pay	compensation	 in	 the	amount	of	12,000	Marcos	 for	having	used	 the	 term	 “né	Murderer”	(“geborene	morder”)	in	one	of	its	editions,	and	having	used	the	term	“cripple”	(“Krüppel”)	in	a	later	edition	to	address	a	reserve	officer	who	was	paraplegic	and	had	succeeded	to	be	called	 to	perform	a	military	duty.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 court	 had	 to	ponder	 and	weigh	 two	fundamental	 rights—the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 expression	 and	 the	 right	 one	 has	 to	 their	honor.	See	ALEXY,	supra	note	21,	at	403-04.	26.	 Article	13	of	the	Portuguese	Constitution	sets	forth	the	following:		1.	All	citizens	possess	the	same	social	dignity	and	are	equal	before	the	law.	2.	No	one	can	be	privileged,	favored,	prejudiced,	prevented	from	exercising	a	right	or	exempted	 from	 any	 duty	 for	 reasons	 of	 their	 ancestry,	 sex,	 race,	 language,	territory	 of	 origin,	 religion,	 ideological,	 or	 political	 convictions,	 education,	economic	situation,	social	condition	or	sexual	orientation.		CONSTITUIÇÃO	DA	REPÚBLICA	PORTUGUESA	[CONSTITUTION	OF	THE	PORTUGUESE	REPUBLIC]	art.	13.	In	the	United	States,	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	the	Constitution	of	the	United	States	embodies	the	principle	of	equality	through	the	equal	protection	clause	that	sets	forth	that	no	state	shall	“deny	to	any	person	within	its	jurisdiction	the	equal	protection	of	the	laws.”	U.S.	CONST.	amend.	XIV.	In	the	doctrine,	for	a	definition	of	the	principle	of	equality	in	the	context	 of	 Canada’s	 multiculturalism	 that	 comprises	 different	 ethnic	 minorities	 and	linguistic	heterogeneity,	see	Terrence	Meyerhoff,	Multiculturalism	and	Language	Rights	in	
Canada:	Problems	and	Prospects	for	Equality	and	Unity,	9	AM.	U.	J.	INT’L	L.	&	POL’Y	913,	963	(1994)	(defining	the	principle	of	equality	as	“equality	of	opportunity	for	individuals	and	equality	in	the	treatment	of,	or	respect	for,	groups.”	Meyerhoff	maintains	that	the	principle	of	equality	 is	composed	of	 two	elements	–	one	 is	 “freedom	from	discrimination	against	individuals;	 the	 other	 …	 focuses	 on	 group	 survival	 in	 the	 form	 of	 assistance	 for	 the	preservation	of	cultural	and	linguistic	distinctiveness”).	27.	 The	 principle	 of	 legality	 or	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 crucial	 in	 administrative	 law	 to	ensure	fairness	and	consistency	of	the	decisions	of	administrative	agencies	or	authorities.	See	Sydney	A.	Shapiro,	The	Top	Ten	Reasons	that	Law	Students	Dislike	Administrative	Law	
and	 What	 Can	 (or	 Should)	 be	 Done	 about	 Them?,	 38	 BRANDEIS	 L.J.	 351,	 352	 (2000)	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1017	The	interpreter	achieves	the	weighing	or	optimization	of	the	principles	 through	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 principle	 of	proportionality. 28 	This	 principle	 includes	 the	 sub-principles	 of		suitability,	necessity,	and	proportionality	in	its	narrow	sense.	For	Alexy,	“fundamental	rights”	are	principles.	Like	Alexy,	the	Author	will	dwell	on	the	concept	of	principle	rather	than	the	concept	of	“fundamental	right.”29	For	Alexy,	the	core	of	the	balancing	process	lies	in	the	“Law	of	Balancing.”30	The	Law	of	Balancing	reflects	the	principle	 of	 proportionality	 in	 its	 narrow	 sense	 and	 can	 be	formulated	as	follows:	“The	greater	the	degree	of	non-satisfaction	of,	 or	 detriment	 to,	 one	 principle,	 the	 greater	 must	 be	 the	importance	of	satisfying	the	other.”31	The	Law	of	Balancing	determines	that	the	interpreter	divide	the	balancing	process	into	three	stages.	The	first	stage	corresponds	to	the	definition	of	the	degree	of	non-satisfaction	of,	or	detriment	to	a	first	principle.	In	the	second	stage,	the	interpreter	defines	the	importance	of	satisfying	the	conflicting	principle.	In	the	third	stage,	the	 interpreter	 must	 determine	 whether	 the	 importance	 of	satisfying	 the	 conflicting	 principle	 justifies	 the	 detriment	 to,	 or	
 (maintaining	that	administrative	law	is	composed	of	three	processes,	the	study	of	which	is	highly	challenging.	He	says	that	“[t]here	is	the:	empowerment	process,	or	the	process	by	which	 the	 agency	 receives	 its	 authority	 to	 make	 decisions	 and	 enforce	 them;	 internal	decision-making	 process,	 or	 the	 process	 by	which	 the	 agency	makes	 its	 decisions;	 and	external	control	process,	or	the	process	by	which	agencies	are	made	accountable	through	judicial	review	and	through	review	by	elected	officials”.	In	all	of	these	processes,	statutory	law	more	than	case	law	embodies	the	principle	of	legality).	28.	 The	principle	 of	 proportionality	 is	 set	 forth	by	 the	Portuguese	Constitution	 in	Article	 18(2).	 CONSTITUIÇÃO	 DA	REPÚBLICA	 PORTUGUESA	 [CONSTITUTION	 OF	 THE	 PORTUGUESE	REPUBLIC]	art.	18(2).	This	article	maintains	that	the	law	may	only	restrict	rights,	freedoms,	and	guarantees	in	the	cases	expressly	provided	for	in	the	Constitution.	Those	restrictions	must	 be	 strictly	 necessary	 to	 safeguard	 other	 constitutionally	 protected	 rights	 or	principles.	Id.	See	Richard	S.	Frase,	Limiting	Excessive	Prison	Sentences	under	Federal	and	State	Constitutions,	11	U.	PA.	J.	CONST.	L.	39,	48	(2008)	(saying	that	when	courts	seek	to	enforce	 constitutional	 proportionality	 limits	 on	 sentencing	 (or	 on	 other	 government	measures),	 they	 should	 only	 intervene	 if	 the	 burdens	 on	 the	 defendant	 are	 clearly	excessive	relative	to	the	benefits,	or	if	alternative	sanctions	or	other	measures	are	clearly	less	burdensome	and	equally	effective).	For	a	critique	of	the	principle	of	proportionality,	see	Francisco	J.	Urbina,	A	Critique	of	Proportionality,	57	AM.	J.	JURIS.	49	(2012).	29 .	 Robert	 Alexy,	 Sobre	 los	 Derechos	 Constitucionales	 a	 Protección	 [Regarding	
Constitutional	 Rights	 to	 Protection],	 in	 ROBERT	ALEXY:	DERECHOS	 SOCIALES	 Y	 PONDERACIÓN	[ROBERT	ALEXY:	SOCIAL	RIGHTS	AND	BALANCING]	56-57	(Ricardo	García	Manrique	ed.,	2007).	30.	 See	ALEXY,	supra	note	21,	at	50-56,	66-69,	102.	31.	 Id.	at	102.	
1018	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	non-satisfaction	of,	 the	 first	 principle.32	To	 ascertain	 the	 specific	weight	of	each	of	the	principles,	that	is,	the	principle	of	equality	and	the	 principle	 of	 legality,	 and	which	 of	 them	 is	 of	 comparatively	greater	importance,	the	Author	breaks	the	Law	of	Balancing	down	into	its	essential	elements	and	applies	the	“Weight	Formula”	to	the	case.	The	degree	of	non-satisfaction	or	restriction	of	one	principle	and	 the	degree	or	 importance	of	satisfaction	of	 the	other	can	be	assessed	through	a	Triadic	Scale	or	a	model	of	three	intensities—
light,	moderate,	or	serious	(l,	m,	or	s).33		The	 first	 object	 of	 valuation	 as	 l,	m,	 or	 s	 is	 the	 intensity	 of	interference	 (I)	 with	 a	 principle	 (Pi)	 in	 a	 given	 case	 (C).	 Alexy	assigns	the	meaning	IPiC	or	Ii	to	the	principle	whose	restriction	or	infringement	 is	 analyzed.	 The	 interference	 with	 a	 principle	 is	concrete.	 Therefore,	 the	 intensity	 of	 interference	 or	 non-satisfaction	of	 that	principle	has	 an	equally	 concrete	magnitude.	Nevertheless,	to	stress	the	precise	magnitude	of	interference,	the	letter	(C)	is	associated	to	the	meaning	provided	above	referring	to	the	circumstances	of	the	case	that	are	relevant	to	the	decision.34	The	second	object	of	valuation	as	l,	m,	or	s	is	the	importance	of	satisfaction	(S)	of	the	conflicting	principle	(Pj).	The	importance	of	satisfaction	of	the	conflicting	principle	also	refers	to	the	concrete	importance	or	actual	weight	of	that	principle.	In	line	with	what	the	Author	said	on	the	intensity	of	interference	with	Pi,	the	same	can	now	be	said	of	Pj.	The	concept	of	concrete	importance	or	weight	is	similar	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 intensity	 of	 interference	 with	 Pi,	
 32.	 Id.	at	105	(“stating	that	[…]	the	Law	of	Balancing	is	not	valueless.	It	identifies	what	is	significant	in	balancing	exercises,	namely	the	degree	or	intensity	of	non-satisfaction	of,	or	detriment	to,	one	principle	versus	the	importance	of	satisfying	the	other”).	33.	 ALEXY,	supra	note	21,	at	405.	For	a	critique	of	these	valuation	measures,	see	José	Juan	Moreso,	Alexy	y	la	Aritmética	de	la	Ponderación	[Alexy	and	the	Arithmetic	of	Balancing],	
in	 ROBERT	 ALEXY:	 DERECHOS	 SOCIALES	 Y	 PONDERACIÓN	 [ROBERT	 ALEXY:	 SOCIAL	 RIGHTS	 AND	BALANCING]	232-33	(Ricardo	García	Manrique	ed.,	2007).	34.	 ALEXY,	supra	note	21,	at	405-06.	The	balancing	or	weighing	of	principles	Alexy	engages	 in	reflects	his	definition	of	principles	as	optimization	requirements.	He	weighs	principles	involved	in	a	case.	Therefore,	balancing	which	aims	to	help	the	interpreter	find	the	 most	 correct	 answer,	 does	 not	 rely	 solely	 on	 a	 deductive	 scheme	 by	 which	 the	interpreter	infers	the	applicable	rule.	Balancing,	which	is	tied	to	argumentation,	is	based	on	 the	concrete	or	 relative	weight	of	 the	principles	 in	a	 case.	The	circumstances	of	 the	specific	case	that	are	essential	for	the	legal	decision	refer	to	the	administrative	order	of	expulsion	from	the	country	of	the	illegal	immigrant	who	was	a	victim	of	a	crime,	and	to	the	consequences	which	the	implementation	or	non-execution	of	such	order	will	have	on	the	relevant	principles	under	analysis.	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1019	because	 it	 deals	with	 the	 intensity	 of	 a	 possible	 interference	 or	restriction	 in	the	 face	of	non-interference.	Therefore,	concerning	
Pj,	the	interpreter	can	adopt	the	analogous	formula	SPjC.35	What	is	the	degree	of	interference	(I)	with	Pi	and	what	is	the	concrete	importance	of	satisfaction	(S)	of	Pj,	to	which	the	Law	of	Balancing	refers?	 In	other	words,	what	 is	 the	concrete	degree	of	interference	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 in	 relation	 to	 the	principle	of	legality?	What	is	the	effect	that	the	non-satisfaction	or	interference	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 produces	 in	 the	satisfaction	or	fulfillment	of	the	principle	of	legality?	What	kind	of	constraints	 does	 the	 Constitution	 impose	 on	 the	 principle	 of	equality	 when	 it	 provides	 that	 the	 principle	 of	 legality	 is	 a	cornerstone	of	the	democratic	State?	Does	satisfying	the	principle	of	 legality	 justify	 restricting	 or	 not	 satisfying	 the	 principle	 of	equality?	To	respond	to	these	questions,	the	interpreter	must	take	the	following	three	steps:	(a)	evaluate	IPiC	as	l,	m	or	s;	(b)	evaluate	SPjC	as	 l,	m	or	s;	 and	(c)	 relate	 the	 two	previous	valuations,	by	using	criteria	 of	 comparability	 and,	 therefore,	 of	 commensurability,	perceived	 from	 a	 common	 point	 of	 view.	 This	 common	 point	 of	view	 is	 yielded	 by	 the	 Constitution,	 insofar	 as	 it	 stands	 for	 the	shared	 feeling	 of	 the	 community.	 The	 judge	 in	 our	 case	 must	evaluate	the	principle	of	equality	and	the	principle	of	 legality	by	resorting	 to	 classic	 criteria	 of	 constitutional	 interpretation.	Generally,	constitutional	interpretation	does	not	differ	from	other	types	of	interpretation.	However,	constitutional	rights	norms	have	an	open	texture	that	challenges	the	interpreter	in	their	craft.	The	 comparability	 of	 the	 principles	 as	 outlined	 above	 is	carried	out	 through	a	“Weight	Formula”.	This	 formula	 illustrates	the	 structure	 underlying	 the	 Triadic	 Scale	 with	 the	 help	 of	numbers. 36 	This	 formula	 determines	 the	 concrete	 weight	 of	 a	principle.	It	reflects	the	idea	that	principles	become	stronger	if	the	intensity	 of	 their	 constraint	 increases.	 It	 expands	 the	 Law	 of	Balancing.	It	goes	as	follows:	WPi,j	C	=	IPiC/SPjC37	
 35.	 Id.	at	406.	36.	 Id.	at	408.	37.	 Id.	
1020	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	In	our	case,	the	interpreter	measures	the	concrete	weight	(W)	of	the	 principle	 of	 equality	 (Pi)	 by	 the	 effects	 the	 non-interference	with	the	principle	of	legality	(Pj)	has	on	the	principle	of	equality.	Put	differently,	the	higher	the	weight	of	the	principle	of	legality	in	a	concrete	case,	the	more	restrictive	the	principle	of	equality	will	be.38		The	Weight	Formula	determines	that	the	concrete	weight	of	a	principle	 be	 obtained	 through	 the	 quotient	 of	 the	 intensity	 of	interference	with	this	principle	(Pi)	and	the	concrete	importance	of	the	competing	principle,	(Pj).	The	concrete	weight	of	a	principle	is,	therefore,	a	relative	weight,	which	is	expressed	by	the	formula	
Pi,j.	The	concrete	weight	of	Pi	is	the	concrete	weight	of	Pi	relative	to	Pj.39		Here,	 the	 Author	 shall	 refer	 to	 the	 Weight	 Formula	 to	determine	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	 restriction	 on	 the	 principle	 of	equality	(Pi).	By	ascertaining	the	intensity	of	interference	with	the	principle	of	equality,	 the	Author	will	be	able	to	assess	the	actual	weight	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 the	principle	of	legality	(Pj).	The	author	allocates	the	values	20,	21,	and	22	,	that	is,	1,	2,	and	4	to	the	three	values	of	the	Triadic	Scale	(l,	m,	and	s)	and	applies	such	numbers	to	our	case.40	This	way,	the	Author	can	verify	that	the	 order	 of	 expulsion	 of	 the	 foreign	 citizen	 interfered	with	 the	principle	of	equality	(Pi)	on	the	basis	of	value	4	(s).	On	the	contrary,	that	order	of	expulsion	interfered	with	the	principle	of	legality	(Pj)	on	the	basis	of	value	1	(l).41	Hence:	s,	l	=	4	/	1	=	4	However,	let	us	consider	the	contrary	situation—that	is,	the	interpreter	restricts	the	principle	of	legality	(Pj)	based	on	value	4,	and	restricts	the	principle	of	equality	(Pi)	based	on	value	1.	l,	s	=	l	/	4	=	1	/	4	
 38.	 Id.	at	408-09.	39.	 Id.	at	409.	40.	 Id.	at	409-10.	41.	 ALEXY,	 supra	 note	 21,	 at	 410.	 Indeed,	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 restriction	 value	 of	 the	principle	 of	 legality	 should	 be	 null,	 since	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Immigration	 and	 Border	Services,	subsequently	confirmed	by	the	“courts	a	quo	and	ad	quem”,	merely	applied	the	law	qua	tale.	Nevertheless,	the	Author	lets	the	values	presented	in	the	formula	to	guide	her	for	she	deems	them	sufficient	to	demonstrate	what	the	Author	intends.	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1021	This	 scenario	 allows	us	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 principles	 (Pi)	acquire	 a	 higher	 concrete	 weight	 when	 the	 intensity	 of	 their	restriction	 increases	on	minor	grounds.42	Inherent	 to	 this	 idea	 is	the	 impression	 that	 principles	 increase	 their	 resistance	 as	 the	intensity	of	 the	 interference	with	 them	 increases.	Why?	Because	the	 resistant	 core	 of	 fundamental	 rights	 with	 the	 structure	 of	principles	manifests	itself	whenever	it	faces	an	interference.	In	this	context,	 the	more	 the	 interpreter	 interferes	with	 the	 core	of	 the	right	to	equal	treatment	deriving	from	the	principle	of	equality,	the	higher	 is	 the	 resistance	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 to	 that	interference.43	In	respect	to	the	case	under	analysis,	it	is	important	to	ask	the	following.	 Is	 there	 a	 disproportionate	 interference	 with	 the	principle	 of	 equality	 considering	 the	 weight	 of	 the	 principle	 of	legality?44	What	effect	do	 the	constitutional	provisions	 that	 “[a]ll	citizens	 have	 the	 same	 social	 dignity	 and	 are	 equal	 before	 the	law”45	and	“[f]oreigners	and	stateless	persons	who	are	or	reside	in	Portugal	 enjoy	 the	 rights	 and	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 duties	 of	 the	Portuguese	citizens”46	have	on	the	principle	of	legality?	In	the	case	at	hand,	the	restriction	of	the	principle	of	equality	was	 disproportionate.	 The	 Weight	 Formula	 demonstrates	 that	disproportionality.	 The	 degree	 of	 protection	 the	 interpreter	afforded	to	the	principle	of	legality	was	higher	than	the	protection	
 42.	 	Id.	43.	 Id.	at	424	(stating	that	“[.	.	.]	as	interference	with	a	constitutional	right	increases,	so	also	does	[.	.	.]	its	substantive	resistance”).		44.	 It	should	be	noted	that	the	concrete	importance	of	Pj	(the	principle	of	legality)	is	measured	by	the	degree	of	the	intensity	of	the	interference	with	Pj	as	a	result	of	the	non-interference	with	Pi.	 In	other	words,	 the	 lower	 the	 interference	with	Pi,	 the	higher	 the	interference	with	Pj.	Take,	for	example,	the	conflict	that	frequently	arises	between	the	right	to	 honor	 and	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 expression.	 Although	 these	 are	 two	 fundamental	rights,	 Alexy	 treats	 fundamental	 rights	 as	 principles.	 Thus,	 the	 present	 considerations	apply	both	to	fundamental	rights	and	principles.	If	a	judge	considers	that	there	is	a	reason	not	 to	 restrict	 the	 right	 to	honor	given	 the	 circumstances	of	 the	 case,	 then	 the	 right	 to	freedom	of	expression	will	be	restricted	as	a	result	of	the	non-restriction	of	the	right	to	honor.	Thus,	the	importance	of	the	principle	of	legality	arises	from	the	calculation	of	the	intensity	of	its	restriction	resulting	from	the	non-restriction	of	the	principle	of	equality.	45.	 Article	13	(1)	of	the	Portuguese	Constitution	sets	forth	that	“[a]ll	citizens	possess	the	 same	 social	 dignity	 and	 are	 equal	 before	 the	 law”.	 CONSTITUIÇÃO	 DA	 REPÚBLICA	PORTUGUESA	[CONSTITUTION	OF	THE	PORTUGUESE	REPUBLIC]	art.	13(1).	46.	 Article	 15	 (1)	 of	 the	 Portuguese	 Constitution	 sets	 forth	 that	 “[f]oreigners	 and	stateless	persons	who	find	themselves	or	who	reside	in	Portugal	enjoy	the	same	rights	and	are	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 duties	 as	 Portuguese	 citizens.”	 CONSTITUIÇÃO	 DA	 REPÚBLICA	PORTUGUESA	[CONSTITUTION	OF	THE	PORTUGUESE	REPUBLIC]	art.	15(1).	
1022	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	they	 gave	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 equality.	 The	 interpreter	 did	 not	interfere	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 legality	 by	 interfering	 with	 the	principle	of	equality.	The	intensity	of	the	interpreter’s	interference	with	the	principle	of	legality	was	lower	for	their	interference	with	the	principle	of	equality	was	much	higher.	The	court	restricted	the	principle	of	equality	based	on	an	idea	of	 protection	 of	 the	 public	 interest	 and	 the	 public	 order.	 The	Author	 does	 not	 believe	 that	 the	 reasons	 that	 led	 to	 the	interference	with	the	principle	of	equality	were	stronger	than	the	reasons	 justifying	 the	 non-interference	 with	 the	 principle	 of	equality.	The	rights	that	foreign	nationals	have	to	have	the	same	rights	Portuguese	citizens	enjoy	extended	to	them	because	those	foreign	nationals	share	the	same	social	dignity	and	have	the	right	to	 not	 to	 be	 discriminated	 against	 the	 law	 justify	 the	 non-interference	with	the	principle	of	equality.	While	reading	this	case,	the	Author	adopts	a	universalist	perspective	that	bears	 its	stand	from	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 interpreter	 should	 read	 legal	 and	constitutional	provisions	in	line	with	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights.47	This	sort	of	interpretation	pays	tribute	to	the	fact	that	fundamental	rights	are	not	subject	to	political	bargaining	or	loose	 judgments.	They	must	and	can	be	exercised	by	any	person	regardless	of	 their	citizenship	or	nationality.	 In	 this	respect,	 it	 is	essential	 to	analyze	 the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights,	which	 requires	 that	 Contracting	 Parties	 secure,	 recognize,	 and	observe	 the	 human	 rights	 and	 fundamental	 freedoms	 of	 every	person	under	their	jurisdiction,48	and	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	European	Union.49	Article	1	of	the	Charter	sets	forth	that	 “Human	 dignity	 is	 inviolable.	 It	 must	 be	 respected	 and	protected.”	However,	Alexy’s	assertiveness	is	infinite	because	he	does	not	consider	the	system	of	precedence	between	principles	as	stagnant.	Weighing	allows	the	interpreter	to	move	toward	correctness	and	obtain	more	truth,	but	not	all	the	truth.	This	incompleteness	is	a	reality	because	the	system	of	precedence	between	principles	can	
 47 .	 See	 Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 G.A.	 Res.	 217	 (III)	 A,	 U.N.	 Doc.	A/RES/217(III)	(Dec.	10,	1948).	48.	 See	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms,	Nov.	4,	1950,	Europ.T.S.	No.	5;	213	U.N.T.S.	221.	49.	 See	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	European	Union,	Dec.	18,	2000,	2000	O.J.	(C364).	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1023	subside.	That	system	will	subside	insofar	as	those	who	intend	to	undertake	such	a	modification	argue	accordingly.	(Again,	we	are	in	the	 realm	 of	 the	 discursively	 possible). 50 	Their	 discourse	 must	respect	the	limits	of	practical	argumentation,	legal	argumentation,	and	the	model	of	rationality	of	the	democratic	rule	of	law.	
B.	Ronald	Dworkin:	Principles	or	a	Question	of	Principle?	The	
Interpretative	Model	and	the	System	of	Monological	Rationality	-	
Hercules,	the	Judge.	Alexy,	 like	 Dworkin,	 considers	 that	 the	 difference	 between	rules	and	principles	is	essentially	conceptual	or	qualitative	and	not	one	 of	 degree	 or	 commensurability. 51 	Hence,	 the	 Author	 has	chosen	 to	 compare	 Alexy	 and	Dworkin.	 As	 she	 reads	 Dworkin’s	work,	 she	 realizes	 how	 Dworkin	 invokes	 profound	 moral	principles	that	underlie	the	idea	of	equality	of	all.	He	understands	the	principle	of	equality	as	equal	concern	and	respect.	He	almost	treats	 it	 as	 a	 self-evident	 truth,	 which	 is	 in	 line	 with	 his	understanding	that	there	may	be	one	single	right	answer	to	a	hard	case.	Equal	concern	and	respect	for	your	fellow	citizen	would	be	the	correct	answer.	In	a	democracy,	numbers	count.	However,	in	Dworkin’s	view,	democracy	 represents	 more	 than	 the	 majority	 rule. 52 		 At	 a	conference	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Nebraska	 in	 2008,	 Dworkin	lectured	on	democracy,	religion,	and	relations	between	the	United	States	of	America	and	Israel	(referring	to	themes	such	as	Zionism	and	 immigration).	 Therein,	 he	 reiterated	 an	 idea	 that	 has	 been	widely	 reproduced	 in	 his	 scholarship	 --	 “democracy	 must	 be	 a	partnership	that	allows	each	citizen	over	whom	the	nation	claims	dominion	 and	 from	 whom	 it	 extracts	 allegiance	 to	 see	 the	government	as	his	government,	and	that	[…]	is	not	possible	unless	the	 government	 shows	 to	 each	 citizen	 equal	 concern	 and	 equal	
 50.	 ALEXY	ARGUMENTATION,	supra	note	6,	at	135-36.	51.	 See	ALEXY,	supra	note	21,	at	48	(saying	that	“	[…]	the	distinction	between	rules	and	principles	is	a	qualitative	one	and	not	one	of	degree.	Every	norm	is	either	a	rule	or	a	principle”).		52.	 See	RONALD	DWORKIN,	LAW’S	EMPIRE	177	(1986)	 (stating	 that	 “[w]e	might	 think	that	majority	rule	is	the	fairest	workable	decision	procedure	in	politics,	but	we	know	that	the	majority	will	 sometimes,	 perhaps	 often,	make	 unjust	 decisions	 about	 the	 rights	 of	individuals”).	
1024	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	respect.”53	Accordingly,	the	rights	of	those	groups	often	referred	to	as	 “minorities”—thus	 categorized	 by	 criteria	 such	 as	 race,	ethnicity,	 nationality,	 gender,	 	 sexual	 orientation,	 and	 religion—must	be	indisputably	protected.		This	 appeal	 to	 the	 protective	 role	 of	 the	 state	 derives	 from	Dworkin’s	personification	of	the	state	and	the	community,	which,	in	his	work	are	treated	as	moral	agents,	that	like	the	partnership	or	 the	 corporation	 have	 a	 separate	 personality	 from	 their	members.	The	implication	of	this	personification	is	the	creation	of	an	 associative	 obligation 54 	between	 the	 members	 of	 that	community	 from	which	 it	 derives	 a	 social	 responsibility	 of	 each	member	 to	 feel	 outraged	 whenever	 state	 officials	 do	 not	 treat	every	 single	 member	 of	 that	 community	 with	 the	 equal	consideration	and	respect	they	deserve.	He	maintains	that:	Once	 we	 accept	 that	 our	 officials	 act	 in	 the	 name	 of	 a	community	 of	 which	 we	 are	 all	 members,	 bearing	 a	responsibility	 we	 therefore	 share,	 then	 this	 reinforces	 and	sustains	 the	 character	 of	 collective	 guilt,	 our	 sense	 that	 we	must	feel	shame	as	well	as	outrage	when	they	act	unjustly.55	In	 that	 talk	 he	 gave	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Nebraska	 in	 2008,	Dworkin	uttered	that	a	Democracy	must	show	equal	concern	and	equal	 respect	 for	 its	 citizens.	 However,	 he	 clarified	 that	 a	Democracy	does	not	need	to	show	equal	concern	for	every	person	who	would	like	to	be	a	citizen.	No	nation	opens	its	doors	to	all	those	who	would	 like	 to	 come,	 he	 said.56	Indeed,	 the	 government	 of	 a	State	may	not	adopt	an	immigration	policy	nor	have	it	as	a	priority.	However,	the	State	cannot	fail	to	act	with	respect	for	those	upon	
 53.	 Democracy	 and	 Religion:	 America	 and	 Israel,	 MEDIAHUB,	https://mediahub.unl.edu/media/546	[https://perma.cc/YLZ2-R5UJ]	(last	visited	Apr.	1,	2020)	[hereinafter	Democracy	and	Religion].	54.	 RONALD	DWORKIN,	supra	note	52	at	196	(defining	associative	obligations	as	“[.	.	.]	the	special	responsibilities	social	practice	attaches	to	membership	in	some	biological	or	social	 group,	 like	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 family	 or	 friends	 or	 neighbors.”	 These	 are	obligations	that	one	does	not	necessarily	deliberately	choose	to	accept	them.	The	duty	to	honor	 our	 responsibilities	 under	 social	 practices	 that	 define	 groups	 and	 attach	responsibilities	to	membership	depend	on	conditions	of	reciprocity.	The	members	of	the	group	 must	 regard	 those	 obligations	 as	 special	 and	 personal.	 The	 members	 must	understand	 their	 responsibilities	 as	 stemming	 from	 their	 concern	 for	 the	well-being	of	others	in	the	group.	That	concern	must	be	equally	shown	for	all	members	of	the	group.	These	associative	communities	are	political	communities.	Id.	at	198-202).	55.	 RONALD	DWORKIN,	supra	note	52,	at	175.	56.	 See	Democracy	and	Religion,	supra	note	53.	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1025	whom	 it	 exercises	 and	 claims	 to	 have	 dominion,	 even	 if	 to	maintain:	 “our	 law	does	not	apply	 to	you.”	At	 the	very	 least,	 the	State	cannot	do	so	in	a	way	which	shows	complete	disrespect	for	the	fundamental	rights	of	those	citizens.	The	 neuralgic	 point	 of	 Dworkin’s	 critique	 of	 the	 utilitarian	theses	 and	 positivist	 conceptions	 of	 authors	 such	 as	 Jeremy	Bentham,	John	Austin,	and,	in	particular,	Herbert	L.	Hart,	lies	in	the	realization	that	respect	for	individual	principles	and	rights,	which	can	be	used	as	trumps	against	the	state	because	they	are	prior	to	the	State,	binds	judicial	decisions.57	He,	therefore,	adopts	an	anti-Archimedean	 stand.	 He	 refutes	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 fixed	 point,	outside	of	common	morality,	through	which	it	would	be	possible	to	leverage	 a	 response	 to	 a	 question	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 normative	debate.	The	theory	of	adjudication	that	Dworkin	develops	is	based	on	an	interpretative	model	of	adjudication.	He	bases	his	model	on	a	metaphor—Hercules,	the	judge.58	It	is	an	ideal	mythological	figure,	endowed	 with	 superpowers	 because	 Hercules	 is	 part	 of	 the	historical	 reality	 of	 a	 community	 in	 which	 it	 shares	 the	 idea	 of	morality.	Alone,	Hercules	evaluates	the	fundamental	principles	of	that	 community,	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 an	 adjudication	 process	created	by	himself.	The	interpretation	Hercules	undertakes	should	conceive	Law	as	 integrity.	 That	 is,	 the	 judge,	 when	 analyzing	 the	 applicable	norms,	should	try	to	understand	what	their	best	justification	will	be	from	the	point	of	view	of	political	morality.59	By	doing	this,	the	judge	must	undertake	a	 constant	dialogue	with	history.	Like	 the	interpreter	in	the	context	of	Alexy’s	theory	of	legal	argumentation	who	 aims	 to	 find	 the	 correct	 answer	 contextually,	 Dworkin’s	Hercules	aims	to	find	the	principle	that	spells	out	the	right	thing	to	
 57.	 RONALD	 DWORKIN,	 TAKING	 RIGHTS	 SERIOUSLY	 233-39	 (1977)	 (using	 the	 case	 of	reverse	 discrimination	 to	 criticize	 utilitarian	 arguments.	 Utilitarian	 arguments	 rely	 on	policies	that	are	understood	to	make	the	community	as	a	whole	better	off,	even	if	they	are	discriminatory.	Pursuant	 to	 the	author,	 “[i]f	we	want	 to	defend	 individual	 rights	 in	 the	sense	in	which	we	claim	them,	then	we	must	try	to	discover	something	beyond	utility	that	argues	for	these	rights”).		Id.	at	271.	58.	 RONALD	DWORKIN,	supra	note	52,	at	239.	59.	 Id.	 at	 225.	 (explaining	 that	 “[t]he	 adjudicative	 principle	 of	 integrity	 instructs	judges	to	identify	legal	rights	and	duties,	so	far	as	possible,	on	the	assumption	that	they	were	all	created	by	a	single	author	–	the	community	personified	–	expressing	a	coherent	conception	of	justice	and	fairness”).		
1026	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	do.	 However,	 unlike	 the	 cases	 adjudicated	 by	 the	 interpreter	 in	Alexy’s	 theory	 of	 legal	 argumentation,	 for	 certain	 cases	 which	Hercules	must	adjudicate,	there	is	one	correct	answer	only,	which	is	not	subject	to	commensurability.		The	 Author	 also	 sees	 Dworkin’s	 interpretive	 model	 of	adjudication	in	light	of	a	set	of	other	metaphors:	 law	works	itself	
pure;	 there	 is	 a	 higher	 law,	 within	 and	 yet	 beyond	 positive	 law,	
toward	which	positive	law	grows;	law	has	its	own	ambitions.60	All	of	these	metaphors	acknowledge	that	judicial	decisions	or	legislative	acts	change	the	law	to	a	certain	extent.	Let	us	take	as	an	example	the	petition	of	the	Brazilian	citizen	who	claimed	the	annulment	of	the	order	of	expulsion	from	the	Portuguese	territory.	If	we	link	the	decision	of	the	judge	to	order	the	expulsion	of	the	Brazilian	citizen	to	 those	 three	 metaphors,	 we	 can	 draw	 one	 of	 the	 following	conclusions.	The	change	of	the	Law	is	inherent	to	a	decision	in	favor	of	the	annulment	of	the	order	to	expel	a	foreign	citizen	whose	physical	integrity	 was	 violated.	 The	 decision	 of	 the	 court	 to	 annul	 such	order	of	expulsion	would	produce	a	change	in	the	law	because	the	right	 to	 reside	 illegally	 in	 the	 country	 is	 not	 explicit	 in	 the	Constitution.	However,	 if	 the	 interpretative	argument	 in	 favor	of	the	annulment	of	the	order	of	expulsion	is	a	good	argument,	then,	the	Law	itself	advocated	for	that	change.	The	Law	fulfilled	its	own	ambitions.	A	change	of	Law	through	adjudication	is	not	neutral,	but	rather	an	improvement	of	the	Law	itself,	in	the	sense	that	a	pure	or	fair	law	is	a	better	law.	The	change	of	the	Law	is	a	clarification	of	what	the	Law	already	is.	If	better	interpretation	of	the	Law	results	in	 the	 adjudication	 of	 a	 constitutional	 right	 to	 a	 certain	 citizen,	denying	that	right	is	the	same	as	denying	the	opportunity	for	the	improvement	of	the	Law.	It	is	also	a	denial	of	the	Law	itself.		In	the	case	under	scrutiny,	there	are	several	things	at	stake.	The	right	of	a	foreign	citizen	who	illegally	resides	in	the	country,	but	over	whom	the	State	exercises	its	jurisdiction,	to	be	treated	in	the	same	way	as	a	national	citizen	would	if	they	were	a	victim	of	a	crime	is	at	stake.	The	right	of	that	foreign	citizen	to	be	protected	by	the	 relevant	 guarantees	 of	 the	 laws	 of	 the	 criminal	 procedure	without	having	to	undergo	a	test	of	confirmation	of	her	situation	in	the	 country	 is	 at	 stake.	 The	 right	 of	 that	 foreign	 citizen	 to	 be	
 60.	 Ronald	Dworkin,	Law’s	Ambitions	for	Itself,	71	VA	L.	REV.	173,	173	(1985).	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1027	protected	by	the	relevant	rules	of	criminal	procedure	that	prevent	the	judge	from	using	inadmissible	evidence	is	at	stake.61	The	right	of	that	foreign	citizen	to	equal	consideration	and	respect	lies	on	the	political	belief	that	no	citizen	should	have	those	rights	put	at	stake.	The	 idea	 of	 integrity	 derives	 from	 the	 political	 ideal	 that	 the	community	we	live	in	is	a	principled	one.	When	the	moment	to	decide	comes,	Hercules	should	ponder	which	 of	 the	 principles	 that	 that	 political	 community	 embraces	they	should	apply	to	the	case.62	Dworkin	believes	that	when	there	is	a	conflict	of	principles	whereby	political	guidelines	clash	on	the	one	 hand,	 and	 individual	 rights	 and	 guarantees	 collide	 on	 the	other,	 the	moral	 perspective	must	 prevail.63	In	 this	 context,	 the	prevalence	of	the	moral	standpoint	is	a	matter	of	principle.		
C.	Hermeneutics	and	the	Process	of	Adjudication:	Hercules	and	the	
Perception	of	the	Other	From	the	above,	a	piece	of	evidence	stands	out:	in	Dworkin’s	doctrine,	 hermeneutics	 assumes	 a	 fundamental	 role.	 There	 is	significant	opposition	between	the	current	legal	order	and	another	one,	 of	 an	 altruistic	 nature,	 of	 solidarity	 and	 openness	 to	 the	
 61.	 Article	32	 (8)	of	 the	Portuguese	Constitution	maintains	 that	 [.	 .	 .]	 all	 evidence	obtained	through	torture,	coercion,	 the	offense	to	 the	physical	or	moral	 integrity	of	 the	individual,	 improper	 intromission	 into	 the	 individual’s	 personal	 life,	 home,	correspondence	 or	 telecommunications	 is	 void.	 CONSTITUIÇÃO	DA	REPÚBLICA	PORTUGUESA	[CONSTITUTION	OF	THE	PORTUGUESE	REPUBLIC]	art.	32	(8).	Article	126(1)	of	the	Portuguese	Criminal	Procedure	Code	substantiates	the	constitutional	provision	and	sets	forth	a	list	of	inadmissible	evidence.	C.P.P.	art.	126(1).	The	Fifth	Amendment	to	the	Constitution	of	the	United	States	sets	forth	that	“No	person	shall	be	[	.	.	.	]	compelled	in	any	criminal	case	to	be	a	witness	against	himself,	nor	be	deprived	of	life,	liberty,	or	property,	without	due	process	of	law.”	U.S.	CONST.	amend.	V.	62.	 Dworkin	does	not	show	how	the	court	should	act	to	ponder	this.	Nevertheless,	the	judge	must	analyze	each	principle	and	ask	what	principles	and	political	guidelines	offer	a	 better	 justification	 of	 the	 Law.	 The	 judge	 must	 ask	 the	 following	 question:	 What	interpretation	of	the	Law	based	on	the	wording	of	the	relevant	legal	provisions	best	serves	those	principles	or	political	guidelines?	63.	 In	our	case,	principles	rather	 than	political	guidelines	are	at	 issue	because	 the	judicial	decision	to	expel	the	foreign	citizen	from	the	country	was	based	on	the	application	of	the	terms	of	the	law	rather	than	the	implementation	of	a	political	statement.	In	our	case,	the	point	is	to	understand	whether	there	is	a	reason	for	the	prevalence	of	the	principle	of	legality	 over	 the	 principle	 of	 equality,	 from	 the	moral	 standpoint.	 In	 the	 quest	 for	 the	solution	to	this	conflict,	the	interpreter	will	ignore	the	political	guidelines	that	might	have	determined	the	enactment	of	the	relevant	legislation.	
1028	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	Other. 64 	In	 postmodern	 States,	 or	 states	 that	 are	 situated	 in	 a	“liquid	modernity,”	the	need	for	openness	to	the	Other	is	pressing.	Hermeneutics	recognizes	this	need.65	Thus,	in	addition	to	being	a	neo-constitutionalist,	Hercules	should	be	hermeneutic.	What	does	 it	mean	 to	be	a	 foreign	citizen	 in	 the	eyes	of	 the	administrative	authorities	and	 in	 the	eyes	of	a	 judge?	A	possible	answer	 can	 be	 found	 through	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 discursive-interpretative	approach	 to	understand	 the	world	 that	surrounds	us;	 through	our	historical	context,	and	 language	to	approach	the	past.	 However,	 the	 discourse	 adopted	must	 be	 pragmatic,	 open,	and	capable	of	breaking	with	the	traditions	and	preconceptions	on	which	we	base	our	finitude,	our	indigence,	our	partiality,	and	our	previous	involvement.	Essentially,	defining	the	meaning	of	foreign	citizen	is	the	same	as	questioning	the	prejudices	that	bind	us	as	a	condition	of	access	to	 knowledge.	 Providing	 such	 definition	 involves	 the	 immersion	into	 a	 profound	 process	 of	 psychoanalysis,	 the	 voluntary	submission	to	a	Freudian	treatment	for	the	recovery	of	prejudice,	through	 dialogue,	 discourse,	 and	 presentation	 of	 arguments	 to	respond	to	the	problems	of	the	present.	Looking	for	that	meaning	is	what	the	judge	in	our	case	should	have	done.	They	should	have	questioned	all	existing	preconceptions	(including	 the	 legal	ones)	and	presented	 arguments	 that	would	 show,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	action	 for	 an	 injunction,	 the	 judge’s	 necessary	 sensitivity	 to	 the	way	 the	expulsion	process	had	been	 triggered.	The	 judge	 in	our	case	 should	 have	 proceeded	 in	 this	 manner	 not	 because	 the	plaintiff-defendant	was	a	Brazilian	citizen,	but	because	she	was	a	foreign	citizen,	who	was	denied	protection	under	the	principle	of	equality.	 If	 no	 national	 citizen	 would	 have	 been	 denied	 that	protection	under	the	same	circumstances,	then	neither	should	that	foreign	citizen	face	that	denial.	
 64.	 ANTÓNIO	MANUEL	HESPANHA,	O	CALEIDOSCÓPIO	DO	DIREITO:	O	DIREITO	E	A	JUSTIÇA	NOS	DIAS	 E	 NO	MUNDO	 DE	HOJE	 [THE	KALEIDOSCOPE	 OF	 LAW:	 LAW	AND	 JUSTICE	NOWADAYS	 IN	 THE	WORLD	TODAY]	476	(2d	ed.	2009).	65.	 Essentially,	the	Author	refers	to	philosophical	hermeneutics.	On	this	matter	and	for	a	preliminary	approach,	see	Zygmunt	Bauman,	The	Challenges	of	Hermeneutics,	in	THE	BAUMAN	READER	125-138	(Peter	Beilharz	ed.,	2001);	Odo	Marquard,	The	Question,	To	What	
Question	Is	Hermeneutics	the	Answer?,	in	FAREWELL	TO	MATTERS	OF	PRINCIPLE:	PHILOSOPHICAL	STUDIES	111	(Robert	Wallace	trans.,	1989)	(1981).	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1029	
IV.	THE	CREATION	OF	A	GENERAL	THEORY	OF	STATE	AND	LAW:	
CONCLUSIONS	What	 is	 the	 value	 of	 fundamental	 rights	 and	 freedoms	assigned	to	national	and	foreign	citizens	in	light	of	the	rule	of	law	and	the	democratic	state?	Has	the	interpreter	fulfilled	the	principle	of	 the	rule	of	 law	and	the	democratic	state	 through	an	 inflexible	conception	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 legality?	 Are	 administrative	authorities	 justified	 to	 deprive	 citizens,	 regardless	 of	 their	nationality,	of	the	constitutional	protection	afforded	to	their	most	fundamental	 rights	 and	 freedoms? 66 	How	 far	 can	 or	 should	administrative	authorities	go?	How	far	can	or	should	the	judge	go?	How	far	can	or	should	the	State	go?	What	is	the	fate	of	the	foreign	citizen?	Administrative	 authorities,	 while	 following	 criteria	 of	efficiency,	competence,	and	promptness	in	their	responses	to	the	claims	of	the	citizens,	must	not	fail	 to	treat	any	individual	as	the	human	 being	 they	 are.	 Thus,	 the	 interpreter	 should	 be	 open	 to	reinterpreting	the	principle	of	legality	and	separation	of	powers.	It	is	 vital	 that	 besides	 their	 executive	 power,	 administrative	authorities	 can	 fill	 in	 the	 gaps	 in	 the	 interstices	 of	 the	 law.	 It	 is	crucial	that	the	public	administrator,	as	well	as	the	judge,	can	intuit	the	 correct	 answer	 (regarding	 the	 case	 at	 hand,	 the	 Author	assumes	 her	 skepticism)	 to	 the	 case.	 That	 level	 of	 intuition	requires	 the	assumption	of	a	more	 intense	relationship	with	 the	law	and	accepts	that	the	interpreter	cannot	reduce	Law	to	only	one	positive	set	of	rules;	the	Law	also	contains	principles.	The	 interpreter	 must	 recognize	 that	 constitutionally	consecrated	 rights	 are	 influential	 beyond	 the	 State-citizen	relationship.	The	interpreter	must	recognize	the	“radiating	effect”	these	rights	have	on	the	overall	 legal	system.67	No	agnosticism	is	justified	here.	Thus,	what	is	essential	for	the	resolution	of	our	case	
 66.	 In	the	text,	the	Author	is	referring	to	fundamental	rights	and	freedoms	such	as	the	right	to	life,	personal	identity,	citizenship,	freedom	of	religion,	etc.	67 .	 See	 ALEXY,	 supra	 note	 21,	 at	 352,	 citing	 the	 Federal	 Constitutional	 Court	 of	Germany:		[A]ccording	 to	 the	 long-standing	case-law	of	 the	Federal	Constitutional	Court,	constitutional	 rights	 norms	 do	 not	 simply	 contain	 defensive	 rights	 of	 the	individual	against	the	state,	but	at	the	same	time	they	embody	an	objective	order	of	values,	which	applies	to	all	areas	of	law	as	a	basic	constitutional	decision,	and	which	provides	guidelines	and	impulses	for	the	legislature,	administration	and	the	judiciary.	
1030	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	and	 other	 similar	 cases	 is	 to	 learn	 the	 way	 the	 judge	 should	interpret	and	apply	the	constitutional	provisions	to	the	case.	As	part	of	public	administration,	the	conduct	of	the	members	of	law	enforcement	was	unacceptable	from	a	constitutional	point	of	 view.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	principles	of	 equality	 and	 justice,	 the	principle	 of	 impartiality68	determines	 that	 their	 actions	 towards	citizens	(whether	they	are	foreigners	or	not)	be	exempt,	objective,	neutral,	and	 independent.	The	principles	of	equality,	 justice,	and	impartiality	also	determine	that	citizens	subject	to	administrative	proceedings	be	acknowledged	the	right	to	know	why	is	it	that,	in	those	circumstances,	they	cannot	be	treated	in	the	same	way	any	national	would	have	if	that	national	had	been	a	victim	of	a	crime	of	offense	to	their	physical	integrity.	The	need	that	citizen	has	to	be	informed	 implies	 that	 administrative	 authorities	 provide	 public	criteria	 for	 assessing	 the	 context.	 In	 our	 case,	 members	 of	 law	enforcement	should	have	felt	compelled	to	explain	the	context	that	prompted	them	to	ask	that	Brazilian	citizen	for	her	passport	as	a	condition	 precedent	 to	 her	 filing	 of	 a	 criminal	 complaint,	 when	they	knew	that	such	request	would	probably	render	the	relevant	criminal	proceedings	unenforceable.	The	respect	for	the	principles	of	equality	and	proportionality	determines	 that	 foreign	 citizens	 cannot	 be	 denied	 fundamental	rights	 to	which	national	 citizens	 also	 are	 entitled.	 If	 such	denial	occurs,	it	must	lie	on	rational	arguments.	The	principle	of	equality	also	 encapsulates	 the	 right	 to	 judicial	 protection.	 Accordingly,	denial	 of	 justice	 to	 a	 foreign	 citizen	 through	 administrative	procedure	restricts	the	principle	of	effective	judicial	protection.69	The	principle	of	effective	judicial	protection	yields	the	adoption	of	precautionary	 measures	 that	 safeguard	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	action.	The	principle	of	effective	judicial	protection	also	prevents	fundamental	 rights	 or	 legally	 protected	 interests,	 which	 the	plaintiff-defendant	meant	to	protect	through	the	action	she	filed,	from	getting	seriously	and	irreparably	injured.	
 68.	 Article	 266	 (2)	 of	 the	 Portuguese	 Constitution	 sets	 forth	 that	 administrative	agents	are	subject	to	the	Constitution	and	the	rule	of	law	and	must	act	with	respect	for	the	principles	of	equality,	proportionality,	justice,	impartiality,	and	good	faith.	CONSTITUIÇÃO	DA	REPÚBLICA	PORTUGUESA	[CONSTITUTION	OF	THE	PORTUGUESE	REPUBLIC]	art.	266(2).	69.	 Article	20	of	the	Portuguese	Constitution	foresees	the	right	to	effective	judicial	protection	 and	 Article	 268(4)	 lists	 a	 number	 of	 rights	 and	 guarantees	 constitutionally	provided	to	citizens	who	deal	with	administrative	authorities.	CONSTITUIÇÃO	DA	REPÚBLICA	PORTUGUESA	[CONSTITUTION	OF	THE	PORTUGUESE	REPUBLIC]	arts.	20,	268(4).	
2020]	 BALANCING	PRINCIPLES	 1031	The	correct	resolution	of	the	case	that	illustrates	this	text	is	a	matter	of	principles,	for	which	denial	the	judge	did	not	find	good	reasoning.	The	interpreter	can	only	give	real	existence	to	the	rule	of	 law	 and	 the	 informing	 principles	 of	 the	 democratic	 state	 by	undertaking	a	correct	interpretation	of	the	law.	They	can	achieve	that	 by	 following	 rules	 of	 procedure	 that	 control	 their	 legal	argumentation	 and	 by	 interpreting	 the	 law	 based	 on	 criteria	 of	integrity	and	in	line	with	the	applicable	constitutional	norms.	The	constitutional	 interpretation	 that	 pays	 tribute	 to	 the	 ideals	 of	integrity,	coherence,	and	correctness	will	allow	the	realization	of	the	rule	of	law	and	the	democratic	state.	That	interpretation	will	allow	the	creation	of	a	general	 theory	of	 the	State	and	Law.	The	most	 fundamental	 constitutional	 principles	 will	 strengthen	 that	theory	to	its	core.		In	the	words	of	Habermas:			If	 one	 shares	Dworkin’s	deontological	understanding	of	 law	and	follows	 the	argumentation-theoretic	 considerations	advanced	by	such	authors	as	Aarnio,	Alexy,	and	Günter,	one	will	agree	with	two	theses.	First,	legal	discourse	cannot	operate	self-sufficiently	inside	a	hermetically	sealed	universe	of	existing	norms	but	must	rather	remain	 open	 to	 arguments	 from	 other	 sources.	 In	 particular,	 it	must	 remain	 open	 to	 the	 pragmatic,	 ethical,	 and	moral	 reasons	brought	to	bear	in	the	legislative	process	and	bundled	together	in	the	legitimacy	claim	of	legal	norms.	Second,	the	rightness	of	legal	decisions	is	ultimately	measured	by	how	well	the	decision	process	satisfies	 the	 communicative	 conditions	 of	 argumentation	 that	make	impartial	judgment	possible.70									
 70.	 JÜRGEN	HABERMAS,	supra	note	7,	at	230.	
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